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Abstract Prior used our emotions to argue that tensed language cannot be trans-
lated by tenseless language. However, it is widely accepted that Mellor and Mac-
Beath have shown that our emotions do not imply the existence of tensed facts. I
criticise this orthodoxy. There is a natural and plausible view of the appropriateness
of emotions which in combination with Prior’s argument implies the existence of
tensed facts. The Mellor/MacBeath position does nothing to upset this natural view
and therefore is not sufficient to block one drawing conclusions for the metaphysics
of time from the nature of our emotions.
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1 Introduction
Our emotions ground a proof that tensed language cannot be reduced to or translated
by tenseless language, as has been shown by Prior. However, it is widely accepted
that Mellor and MacBeath have shown that our emotions do not imply the existence
of tensed facts. In this paper I will show that they are mistaken. There is a natural
and plausible view of the appropriateness of emotions which in combination with
Prior’s argument implies the existence of tensed facts. The Mellor/MacBeath
position does nothing to upset this natural view and offers nothing of equal
explanatory force therefore it does not undermine the implication that tensed facts
exist.
The content of this paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines Prior’s argument for
the impossibility of translation and potential implications for the metaphysics of
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time. Section 2 gives Mellor’s initial response and the improved Mellor/MacBeath
response. Section 3 argues that our everyday behaviour implies a view of emotions
according to which our emotions are justified by the facts that they are responsive
to. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 argue tensed emotions have different patterns of
justification from tenseless ones. If the view of emotions outlined in Sect. 3 is
adopted, it hence follows that tensed emotions must be responses to different facts
from tenseless emotions, moreover, these tensed facts must obtain given many
tensed emotions are appropriate. Section 5 highlights some other inadequacies of
the Mellor/MacBeath account. The conclusions of the paper are that our everyday
treatment of emotions can ground an argument for tensed facts and that the Mellor/
MacBeath response to Prior is inadequate. For want of space this paper doesn’t
settle every detail of this view of emotions or hence conclusively establish the
existence of tensed facts but it makes a valuable first step by showing how such a
view of emotions fits our everyday practices and establishing that the issues raised
by Prior’s paper have not yet been settled.
2 Expressing emotions, translation, and tense
According to the tensed view of time, tensed language captures facts that tenseless
language cannot. Linguistic tense maps onto something in the nature of time itself
capturing a metaphysical tense. This is denied by the tenseless theory of time that
takes tensed and tenseless language to capture the same tenseless facts.
The tenseless theory would be proven if all tensed language could be translated
by tenseless language. The view that such translation is possible—the old-tenseless
theory—was common in the first part of the last century. It was suggested that a
translation of a tensed utterance could be provided by a tenseless utterance that
included the date of the utterance or an explicit reference to the utterance (Cf.
Russell 1906; Goodman 1951; Reichenbach 1948). Prior disagreed and on the basis
of our expression of our emotions argued that tensed language can be used on
occasions when tenseless language cannot and hence that they must mean different
things.
Prior considers a case in which he says ‘‘Thank goodness that’s over’’.1 Not
knowing the date, Prior would not say ‘‘Thank goodness the date of the conclusion
of that thing is the 15th of June, 1954’’ even though that was when he was speaking.
Nor is Prior particularly concerned that he makes that utterance [or has that
relief/belief] then and he would not say something like ‘‘Thank goodness the
conclusion of that thing is before this utterance [belief/relief]’’. In short, the emotion
expressed by Prior’s tensed utterance is not equally expressed by any tenseless
alternative (Cf. Prior 1959, 1962).
This entails that the old-tenseless theory is wrong and that we do not have a quick
proof that there are no tensed facts. However, given that Prior’s expression was true
1 Prior was not the first to make use of such a comment in the context of debates about time. Broad
(1938: 267) uses a similar example. (I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out).
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and was appropriate a further issue is raised for the tenseless theory: how could
Prior’s emotion be appropriate and its expression true when there are no tensed
facts? This issue needn’t arise for the tensed view which is hence put at an apparent
advantage.
3 Mellor’s initial response and the improved Mellor/MacBeath
response
Mellor’s initial response to Prior’s case was to distinguish the tensed utterance
‘‘that’s over’’ from the utterance of ‘‘thank goodness’’ which expresses relief
(Mellor 1981a, b ch. 3). Mellor said that the tensed utterance could be true even if
there are no tensed facts because we can provide tenseless truth-conditions for
tensed utterances. For example, an utterance, u, of ‘e is over’ will be true if and only
if u is after e. So Prior’s utterance will be true because it is after the end of the
exams which are its subject. (From here on I will refer explicitly to the exams for
clarity and to avoid adding unnecessary complexities brought in by the use of the
demonstrative). Being after the exams is a tenseless fact and so we do not need
tensed facts to make the utterance true. Mellor says that relief is appropriate after a
painful experience and therefore the relief Prior expresses is appropriate as it is after
the exams. Again, the fact that the relief is after the exams is a tenseless fact and so
we do not need tensed facts to account for the appropriateness of Prior’s relief.
The strength of Mellor’s response lies in his recognition that two expressions
might mean different things but be made true by the same facts. In making this
move Mellor is taking us away from the old-tenseless theory toward the new-
tenseless theory. The new-tenseless theory accepts that tensed language cannot be
translated by tenseless language but denies that a difference in meaning need entail
a difference in truth-maker (rather, asserting that the truth-makers for all language
are tenseless facts).2 Coinciding with this separation of meaning and truth-makers
the new-tenseless theory recognizes the non-extentionality of propositional
attitudes. Two propositional attitudes might concern the same facts without the
subject of those attitudes being aware of this (for example, even though Carroll is
Dodgson, Tim might believe that Carroll wrote fiction but not that Dodgson did).
(From here on, when speaking of the tenseless theory I mean the new-tenseless
theory).3
MacBeath, however, argued that Mellor’s initial response is inadequate because
it is false to think that the relief has no content. Prior is clearly relieved about
something (MacBeath 1983). Moreover, if we accept that the relief has a content it
is clearly a tensed one as Prior is relieved that the exams are over and he is not
2 Although Mellor gives his initial response using the notion of truth-conditions, he later switches to
speaking of truth-makers because he finds the latter terminology more explicit (cf. 1998: xi). I am
sympathetic to this idea and so adopt the truth-maker terminology to increase clarity without changing the
substance of the argument.
3 The refutation of the old-tenseless theory is generally accepted (cf. Oaklander and Smith 1994).
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relieved that they finish before a certain date or before a specific utterance (or any
other entity).
MacBeath offered a different tenseless solution. He pointed out that belief is an
essential intermediary between the facts one is relieved about and the relief one has
as a result. If Prior did not believe the exams were over, he would not be relieved
that they were. Moreover, the relief is responsive to the belief not the fact believed
because one could falsely believe the exams to be over and resultantly be relieved.
The tenseless theorist can thus say that Prior’s relief has a content, namely that the
exams are past, and this is a tensed content. However, in order for Prior to be so
relieved it is not necessary for a tensed fact to obtain. It is sufficient that he has a
belief with a tensed content. Moreover, this belief can be true and made true by
tenseless facts as outlined by Mellor. Prior’s relief that the exams are over is also
appropriate because relief that the exams are over is appropriate after the exams,
which is a tenseless fact. This solution has been adopted quite generally by tenseless
theorists including Mellor (cf. Maclaurin and Dyke 2002; Mellor 1983
respectively).
4 Clarification of Mellor/MacBeath and an everyday view of emotions
MacBeath has rightly argued that Prior is relieved about or for something, namely
the fact that the exams are over. I will refer to this as the object of his relief or belief.
It is that aspect of the world—fact—that he is responding to. This notion of object
should be distinguished from the notion of content.4 By the content of a belief I
mean its intentional aspect or meaning, or its propositional content on some
understandings of that notion. This notion of content is important when considering
the new-tenseless theory as it allows one to say that two expressions or propositional
attitudes can have different contents but the same object. The Mellor/MacBeath
position as I understand it is that Prior’s relief has a tensed content but a tenseless
object.
MacBeath actually allowed for two alternatives: either for tensed and tenseless
beliefs to differ in content but coincide in object; or for them to differ in content and
object, but for the object of a tensed belief not to exist as tenseless facts can make
tensed beliefs true. MacBeath’s openness on this is reflected in his discussion of the
notion of fact where he offered two alternatives: tensed facts can be understood to
be merely intentional (thus rendering tense an aspect of the content), or they can be
understood to be such that they are not intentional but such that they are merely
supposed facts (thus rendering tense an aspect of the object, but an object that does
not obtain) (MacBeath 1983). (I will reserve the term ‘fact’ for such states of the
4 I intend this notion of content to be broad and hence it may not coincide with other uses of the term in
the literature. For example, when Kaplan (1989) speaks of content he means propositional content
allowing tensed and tenseless expressions to differ in character but not content. However, for Mellor
(1998) tensed and tenseless expressions will differ in the propositions they express. Content, as I
understand it, is such that both Kaplan and Mellor take tensed and tenseless expressions to differ in
content.
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world as occur in MacBeath’s latter use. By ‘fact’ I mean something objective and
metaphysically real).5 The position I refer to as the Mellor/MacBeath position is the
one of these alternatives that I take Mellor and many others in the literature to adopt.
However, the fact that MacBeath offered two distinct tenseless answers does not
appear to be recognized in the literature. As will become clear, the arguments I give
below show both alternatives to be inadequate.
The object of Prior’s relief plays an important role in the justifying of his
emotion. It is a role not played by the content of his emotion. (This is what enables
me to argue below that the Mellor/MacBeath position is ultimately inadequate
because it focuses on content.) The object of Prior’s relief is the reason for Prior’s
relief. It is that for which he feels relief and it is that to which he will refer if
someone asks him why he is relieved. It is the motivational reason for Prior’s
emotion. On this occasion the fact which is the object of his emotion is also that
which justifies Prior’s relief. If Prior is relieved the exams are over and they are
over, then his relief is justified.
On this occasion the fact that the exams are over plays three roles: it explains
why Prior is relieved, it motivates his being relieved [is the motivational reason or
object], and it justifies his being relieved [is the justificatory reason].6 It should not
be a surprise that these three roles are played by the same thing on this occasion.
Prior’s being motivated by this fact is no doubt linked to this fact’s justifying such
relief. Prior knows that exams being over justifies relief and this knowledge is
reflected in his being relieved that the exams are over (in his relief having that fact
as object). Further, it is because the fact motivates Prior’s relief that the fact can
explain his relief. This is not to say that these three roles will always be played by
the same thing. Someone might be motivated by something which does not justify
them, justified by something that does not motivate them, or we might explain
someone’s movements without any mention of what motivates them (for example,
with a purely physiological explanation in terms of muscle contractions and neuron
firings).7
MacBeath at times spoke of the object of Prior’s relief as being a merely
intentional entity such that the intentional entity that the exams are over can exist
even though the exams are not over (MacBeath 1983: 86).8 But, the object of Prior’s
relief is clearly not an intentional entity. If we told Prior that the exams were not
over he would not see there to be any reason for his relief and his relief would
disappear even if we told him that the intentional entity that the exams are over still
exists. (That the intentional entity would continue to exist is even quite plausible if
5 Cf. Mellor’s strong, truth-maker notion of fact (1998: 25).
6 This talk of having an emotion for a reason is not undermined by data that emotions begin before a
cognitive element kicks in (cf. Damasio 2000), rather, it is plausible that by emotion we mean something
more than this initial physiological change (it is insofar as they are cognitive and protracted that they are
the focus of normative evaluations) (cf. Solomon 2004).
7 Cf. Alvarez (2009).
8 Cf. Solomon (1993), especially chapter 5, who takes the object of an emotion to be something
subjective and who I believe is shown to be mistaken in just the same way as MacBeath.
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intentional entities are abstract entities, as they appear to be.) Prior’s relief is
responsive to the facts not to a merely intentional entity.
Similarly, Prior should not be relieved that the exams are over if they are not over
whether or not an intentional entity exists. So it is clear that the justificatory reason
for his emotion is also a fact. That the object of Prior’s emotion (i.e. his
motivational reason) and his justificatory reason are both facts is of little surprise. If
motivational and justificatory reasons were thought to belong to two distinct
categories of entity, then no one would ever be motivated by something that justified
them.9
The object of Prior’s relief is thus clearly not an intentional entity. It is a state of
the world or fact. This is clear for two reasons. First, Prior’s relief tracks the facts.
This tracking is mediated by belief, however, so can be unsuccessful when the
relevant belief is false. Second, justificatory reasons for emotions are facts and it
must be the case that Prior is motivated by the kind of thing that justifies him if his
relief is appropriate.
This is to adopt a form of externalism10 about what motivates and justifies
emotions.11 Emotions are motivated and justified by facts. Emotions are responsive
to the world and it is in this responsiveness that their justification lies. This
externalism is apparent in our everyday talk and interactions quite generally. It is
central to our practices of explaining and justifying emotions. The fact that my
grandmother has died justifies and motivates my grief. It leads me to cry and others
to take that crying to be appropriate and to comfort me. Furthermore, if she had not
died, I shouldn’t have been grieving her. The fact that my neighbour has chopped
down my tree justifies and motivates my anger, and so on. This externalism is
closely related to externalism about the motivational and justificatory reasons for
actions. The fact that a car is speeding towards me both motivates and justifies my
action of jumping out of the road.12
As with reasons for action, the strongest criticism of an externalism about
motivational and justificatory reasons for emotions concerns error cases. For
example, suppose that Prior believes the exams are over and as a result is relieved
but the belief is mistaken and the exams are still in progress. It appears that the fact
that the exams are over could not be what motivates Prior because this fact does not
obtain. One might therefore conclude that it must be something else that motivates
him and the obvious candidates are his belief or relief that the exams are over, or its
9 Cf. Dancy (2000: ch. 5).
10 The externalism at issue is specifically a form of non-psychologism about reasons. Reasons are facts,
as opposed to mental states, such as complexes of beliefs and desires [for a similar take on externalism
one might look to Dancy (2000); the opposing view that reasons are mental states is classically given by
Davidson (2001a)]. This use of the term ‘externalism’ differs from some others in the literature, such as
Williams’s which is in part bound with other issues to do with the nature of motivation (cf. Williams
1979).
11 This externalism at least characterizes an important class of common emotions (for example, grief,
relief, anger, jealousy, envy, gratitude, fear, anticipation, and so on), though I do not mean to assert that it
will fit every state that might be thought of as an emotion (perhaps, for example, depression is an
exception).
12 Cf. Dancy (2000) and Alvarez (2010).
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content the intentional entity that the exams are over, contra externalism.
(MacBeath separated the relief and the belief. On certain cognitive views of
emotion there is no need to make this separation, rather emotions can have a content
as beliefs can. I will not take sides on this issue13 and so will speak of emotions and
beliefs, but my argument works on either view).14
The correct thing to say in an error case is, however, not that Prior is motivated
by his relief/belief or an intentional entity, but that his relief has no object. The
relief is not motivated by anything because the belief involved is mistaken. What
Prior cites as his motivating reason does not exist and we should take this at face
value. Being motivated by is a case of taking an attitude towards and it is quite
possible to take an attitude towards a non-existent.15 This might require an
intentional entity to exist but this does not require that the intentional entity is what
the attitude is about. In other words, this might require content but it does not
require that the content is the object. Further, the relief is not justified by anything
either because it is not justified at all because the exams are not over.
There is perhaps a sense in which the relief is excusable if the false belief is held
but this excusableness is a separate matter and furthermore arguably derives from
the fact that were the belief true the relief would be justified. (This last comment
highlights that externalism isn’t committed to the implausible idea that so long as an
emotion is motivated by a fact it is appropriate. Rather, an emotion will be
appropriate when it is motivated by a fact which justifies emotions of that sort or,
putting the point differently, when the object is a justifying reason).16
Nevertheless, MacBeath was right that Prior might mistakenly believe the exams
to be over when they are not over and as a result he might become relieved. The
belief that they are over or its content thus appears to play a role in the origin of
Prior’s relief. However, we have seen that neither the belief nor its content is the
object of Prior’s relief. It is not the reason for which he is relieved. Nor is the belief
or its content what justifies Prior’s relief either in the error case or the one actually at
hand.
In summary, MacBeath was right to bring Mellor around to the idea that Prior’s
relief has an object. However, our everyday practices give this object a role that the
Mellor/MacBeath position makes little recognition of. In particular, the object of an
emotion is what motivates it and therefore it is also what justifies the emotion if that
emotion is appropriate. Further, the entities that play the role of objects are facts and
13 My argument does show that the appropriateness of an emotion cannot simply be identified with the
appropriateness of the belief it involves; it might be appropriate to believe my grandmother will die, but
not to grieve that she will [this perhaps stands against ideas found in, for example, Greenspan (2004)].
14 The belief is distinct from the fact that the belief is had (just as my car is distinct from the fact that I
own it). Externalism could allow that the fact that Prior believes the exams are over is a motivating and
justifying reason for an emotion, for example, if Prior’s belief is mistaken, the fact that he has it is a
reason for me to worry that I am going to have to correct him.
15 Cf. Alvarez (2008). It is wrong to think that the object of motivation must exist in order to cause the
motivation, as is made clear by the fact that one can be motivated by future events.
16 For example, endings of discomforts of ours are reasons for us to be relieved (cf. MacBeath 1983),
loses of ones we love are reasons for us to grieve, and so on.
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hence clearly not the contents of emotions so long as contents are merely intentional
entities.
4.1 Appropriate tensed emotions concern tensed facts: inadequacy
of denying the object exists
As outlined above, the second of MacBeath’s tenseless responses to Prior’s case
involved taking the object of Prior’s relief to be a tensed fact but denying that that
fact obtained (or, more accurately, denying the relief had an object but accepting
that if it did it would have been a tensed fact).17 However, in this section I will argue
that this response to Prior is problematic. In particular, denying that any tensed
emotions have existent objects entails that one cannot refer to the object of a tensed
emotion to account for its justification or appropriateness, contra the account of
emotions outlined in Sect. 3. (Where, specifically, a tensed emotion of relief is one
that can only be accurately expressed or captured with tensed language as Prior’s is
and a tenseless one is one that can only be accurately expressed or captured by
tenseless language).
According to the everyday account of emotions outlined just above an emotion is
appropriate if it is motivated by a fact that justifies an emotion of that sort: that is, if
the object of the emotion is a justificatory reason for that emotion. It follows that an
emotion that lacked an object [or whose object was a non-obtaining fact] would not
be an appropriate emotion. A tenseless response to Prior’s case that took the line
that no tensed emotions had objects would hence entail that no tensed emotions
were appropriate. However, there clearly are cases of appropriate tensed emotions
because Prior’s relief is an example. Therefore, this tenseless response is no good.
Denying that Prior’s relief has an existent object implies that Prior can be relieved
because of something and that thing not obtain and his relief nevertheless be
appropriate. But this is false. If the exams are not over, then Prior oughtn’t to be
relieved that they are.
One might think that my last sentence is mistaken because coherence between
beliefs and emotions is important and so there is a sense in which it ought to be the
case that if Prior believes the exams to be over then he is relieved (whether or not
the exams really are over). I am not sure such a conditional is correct but even if one
did accept it it needn’t negate my point because it is not clear one can detach the
‘ought’ and apply it just to the consequent of the conditional.18 That is, it might be
true that it ought to be the case that if Prior believes the exams to be over then he is
relieved; that Prior does believe the exams to be over; and that it is not the case that
Prior ought to be relieved. This is because the ‘ought’ applies to the conditional as a
whole and cannot be detached and applied just to the consequent of the conditional.
More specifically, it ought to be the case the conditional is satisfied but it could be
satisfied by Prior not having the belief and, as it happens, this is the better way to
17 As noted above, I do not take this to be a response that is widely adopted in the literature, nevertheless,
it is a tenseless response as it denies that there are any tensed facts and it is a response that was given by
MacBeath so it is worth discussing.
18 Cf. Dancy (2000: chs. 2 and 3), and, Broome (2001).
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satisfy it on this occasion.19 If we came across Prior in such a situation we would
assume that he oughtn’t to be relieved and that he oughtn’t to have the belief. Our
reaction would be to correct his mistake in both respects.
Furthermore, if the [would be] object of Prior’s relief that the exams are over is a
tensed fact, this entails that Prior’s belief that the exams are over serves to pick out
that tensed fact. The tenseless theorist’s insistence that Prior’s tensed belief can be
true thus absurdly implies that the belief can be true despite the fact which is its
object failing to obtain. But this is clearly wrong. If the tensed fact which is the
object of Prior’s tensed belief does not obtain then the belief is false. The object
here is not merely pragmatically implied by the belief, as if it arises as a side effect
of the belief or emotion. Rather, it is what the belief or emotion is concerned with.
The point of the last paragraph might be put this way: even if we can state
tenselessly conditions which must be fulfilled for a tensed belief to be true, as
Mellor argues we can, there still remains the question of whether the satisfying of
these conditions is what makes the belief true in the sense of actually grounding the
truth. It is clear that it might be that a state necessarily obtains if and only if a belief
would be true without it being the case that that state is the truth-maker of such
beliefs. For example, it is arguably necessary that the fact that one plus one is equal
to two obtains if and only if a belief that three plus three is equal to six would be
true, but that latter fact would not make such a belief true. Alternatively, the fact
that an electron has spin obtains if and only if a belief that that electron has charge
would be true, but it is not the case that the fact that an electron has spin is the truth-
maker of beliefs that that electron has charge. The point is simply that various facts
can be necessarily coincident with other facts and therefore with the truth of certain
beliefs without being the truth-makers of those beliefs.20 Once a tensed fact is
recognized as the object of the tensed belief the tensed fact appears to ground the
truth of the tensed belief whilst the tenseless truth-conditions merely appear to be
such that they necessarily obtain if the belief is true.
If we recognize a tensed fact to be the [would be] object of Prior’s tensed belief
and we say that that tensed fact does not obtain, then we must say that Prior’s belief
is false. If Prior’s tensed belief is false, then arguably so too are most other tensed
beliefs because we can rerun Prior’s argument for different events. But this is
unacceptable because all of our perceptual beliefs are tensed and so we would be
thrown into a thorough scepticism.
Thus, there are two reasons why the tenseless theorist cannot account for Prior’s
argument by referring to a tensed fact as the object of his relief and denying that fact
19 This might make it sound as if the conditional has normative, justificatory import in this case, contra to
my suggestion that it is the object of, or reason for, the emotion which has justificatory import. However,
this is incorrect. Rather, I believe conditionals such as the one discussed in this paragraph can be shown to
have no normative import of their own, instead they merely reflect the import of reasons. If one has
conclusive reason to believe the exams are over, one will also have reason to be relieved that they are
over, and if one does not have reason to be relieved that they are over, then one will not have conclusive
reason to believe that they are over. It is this nature of reasons that lies behind the conditional that one
ought to be relieved if one believes the exams to be over, and which gives rise to any normative force the
conditional might be thought to have (Cf. Kolodny 2005, 2008).
20 Cf. Lowe (2009).
Appropriate emotions and the metaphysics of time 1953
123
obtains. First, this would entail that no tensed emotions were ever appropriate which
is contra to fact as Prior’s appropriate relief makes clear. Second, this would imply
that all tensed beliefs were false which is contra to fact as Prior’s true belief that the
exams are over makes clear.
4.2 Appropriate tensed emotions concern tensed facts: inadequacy
of tenseless objects
According to the first of MacBeath’s tenseless responses to Prior’s case, the Mellor/
MacBeath response, a tensed emotion has a tensed content but a tenseless object. In
this section I will argue that this response to Prior fails. My argument will have the
following form: according to the everyday view of emotions emotions are made
appropriate by their objects; no tenseless emotions of relief are appropriate;
therefore, no tenseless emotions of relief are made appropriate by their objects;
therefore, the objects of tenseless emotions of relief are not justificatory reasons for
relief; according to the Mellor/MacBeath tenseless theory tensed and tenseless
emotions of relief share [tenseless] objects; therefore, no tensed emotion of relief
has a justificatory reason for relief as an object; therefore, no tensed emotion of
relief is appropriate; however, there are appropriate tensed emotions of relief;
therefore, the tensed and tenseless emotions of relief must have different objects and
the Mellor/MacBeath tenseless theory is mistaken.
If we take the object of Prior’s relief to be a tenseless fact we will be unable to
appeal to this object to account for the justification of Prior’s relief or to provide the
reason for which he formed that relief. Before the exams are over Prior may well
know, and I shall suppose that he does know, that they finish before the date he feels
relief (perhaps he knows from past experience that he will feel relieved when they
are over). Despite this knowledge, Prior does not feel relieved until the exams are
over and nor is Prior justified in feeling relieved that they are over until they are.
The problems here stem from the fact that many emotions have a temporal
orientation. Relief is orientated towards the past. One is justified in feeling relief
when something bad has ended but not before it has.21
Prior not only denies that he has an emotion of relief that can be captured with
tenseless language, he actually questions why anyone would have such an
emotion.22 I take this to raise the issue not only that these tenseless emotions of
relief would be odd, but further that they would be inappropriate. It is appropriate to
be relieved that a discomfort has ended but it is inappropriate to be relieved that a
discomfort will end.23 In a connected manner, it is inappropriate to have a tenseless
21 Mellor takes his masochists to be a counter example to this, I, as was MacBeath, am less convinced.
Rather, perhaps the better thing to say is that the masochist is relieved that the negative state of lacking
pleasure in having pain has ended. At any rate, the argument works just as well with the case of grief, as it
does with relief, and here there is no such exception.
22 Cf. Prior (1959: 17).
23 Even if it is appropriate to be relieved to have learnt that a discomfort will end, for example, be
relieved when one’s discomfort at the prospect of endless discomfort ends. Hoerl (2013) in fact
distinguishes two forms of relief, temporal and counterfactual. If this distinction were accepted my
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emotion of relief because in such tenseless relief one will not know whether or not
the discomfort has ended. Just as Prior’s relief is inappropriate if the exams are not
over, it is also inappropriate if he does not know whether they are.
One could have tenseless beliefs that a discomfort ends at a certain time or
simultaneously with a certain feeling of relief or belief, and also not know whether
that discomfort has ended. In support of this, suppose that mental states are brain
states24 which can be seen in brain scans. One might then point to a screen and refer
to and have a belief/emotion about a pictured brain state without knowing it was
one’s own and if one did not know whether the broadcast was live, without knowing
if the state was present. In this way emotions can be responsive to tenseless facts
and ignorant of tensed ones. Tenseless relief thus lacks a sensitivity to whether a
discomfort has ended yet it is precisely a sensitivity to this that makes a relief
appropriate. (It is important to note that all parties must agree that it is true to say
some things are past and others are not, and therefore these comments do not
presuppose a tensed theory of time.)
Relief is only appropriate when orientated towards the past. Many other emotions
are also temporally orientated. Some are orientated towards the past and others
towards the future or present. Fear is only appropriate when one is or will be in
danger.25 This temporal orientation is embodied in the fact that one must be
sensitive to time in having these emotions if one is going to be appropriate. One is
only so sensitive if the emotions are tensed because tenseless emotions, precisely in
being tenseless, are not so sensitive. (Because of this, one could construct an
argument analogous to the one I have here concerning Prior’s relief using a number
of different cases: my grief that my gran has died, my anticipation of Mellor’s
response, and so on.)
One might be put in mind of Perry’s cases of the essential indexical (Perry 1979).
Perry argued that we cannot explain a professor leaving his office for a 12 pm
meeting by referring to his tenseless beliefs, such as that ‘meeting N starts[tense-
less] at 12 pm 7/7/17’ or ‘to attend meeting N an individual must leave[tenseless]
their office at 12 pm 7/7/17’.26 The reason for this is that the professor might well
have these tenseless beliefs and not be at all motivated to leave his office despite
wanting to attend the meeting. This is because one can have these beliefs at any time
as being tenseless their truth and appropriateness is not time sensitive. In fact, we
can suppose the professor has these tenseless beliefs all morning before the meeting.
To make sense of the change in behaviour of the professor, of his standing to leave
his office, we must suppose that he forms a relevant tensed belief such as that
Footnote 23 continued
argument might only apply to the former sort but this is the sort had by Prior and therefore it is the sort
that is the subject matter of this paper.
24 My argument does not rest on this assumption, just the idea that mental states can be known third-
personally as well as first-personally.
25 Cf. Cockburn (1998).
26 Perry’s conclusion that indexicals are essential is commonly accepted, including by Mellor (e.g.
1981b: ch. 5).
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‘12 pm is now’. It appears that the professor needs a tensed belief to explain his
action just as Prior needs one to explain his emotion.
To draw out the similarity in more detail, one could in fact imagine a professor
forming a tenseless belief and hence leaving his office despite lacking any relevant
tensed belief. Though, of course, the professor would be acting irrationally if he did
so. It would be like a case in which the professor formed the belief ‘two plus two is
equal to four’ and hence left for the meeting.27 (Even if an agent must be rational in
the majority of his actions in order for us to be able to recognize the reasons that he
acts for, we can and regularly do recognize people acting for bad or irrelevant
reasons).28 What this highlights is that we are seeking a rationalizing explanation of
the professor’s action. One which understands it in terms of the reasons he acts for
and, moreover, one that makes his action appear rational. Without the tensed belief
we struggle to do this.29 We cannot make sense of the professor as a rational being.
(As noted above, one can give different forms of explanation besides rationalizing
ones. One could not give a rationalizing explanation of a planet’s orbit.) In the case
of the emotion we are again concerned with a rationalizing understanding in which
the emotion can be seen as appropriate. It is this which cannot be done in the
tenseless case, just as it could not be done with the professor.30 We ought to note
that Perry’s essential indexical is specifically essential for rational actions of a
timely nature and in a connected manner it is essential for appropriate emotions of a
timely nature.
If no tenseless emotion of relief is appropriate, then no tenseless emotion of relief
is justified by the fact it has as object. But, if any emotions of relief have tenseless
facts as objects then tenseless emotions of relief do. This entails that no tenseless
facts justify tenseless emotions of relief and it implies that no tenseless facts justify
any emotions of relief. It is implausible that a tensed emotion of relief would have
27 A third sort of case would be one in which the professor underwent the bodily movements of leaving
his office because he was being physically manipulated by security staff. In this case, unlike the irrational
case, however, it appears that we are no longer looking at an action of the professor’s, insofar as an action
appears to be a specific type of bodily movement (cf. Anscombe 2000, who describes an action as
behaviour we can explain with reference to the agent’s reasons).
28 Cf. Wason (1966) for a much discussed case of recognised irrationality.
29 Without reference to the professor’s beliefs we struggle to see his movements as responsive to reasons
[to see them as actions] and without the professor’s tensed beliefs his movements are not appropriately
responsive to reasons, he is not rational. This is a very important point and when mated with an
externalism about reasons for action affords room for a criticism of Perry’s response to the essential
indexical much like the criticism I am giving here of the Mellor/MacBeath response to Prior’s argument.
Cf. my Pearson (2015).
30 If one thinks of the related case of the first-personal indexical, one might remember that Perry says that
the belief ‘De Gaulle is making a mess’, might play a role in explaining Perry’s stopping, if Perry also
believes ‘I am De Gaulle’. So perhaps one could have a tenseless emotion which was appropriate, if one
also had a tensed belief. For example, if one was relieved that ‘the end of the exams is[tenseless] 12 pm’,
and one believed that ‘it is now 1 pm’. However, this will not do. The explanation of Perry’s act must
include both the first- and third-personal beliefs. Without them it appears irrational. Similarly, the
explanation of the emotion must include the tensed element, without it the emotion appears inappropriate.
But, the object of the emotion is here specifically the reason the emotion is had for, that which could
rationalize it, hence, the emotion must be tensed (if appropriate). It being 1 pm now is [part of] why one is
relieved, that is, one is [in part] relieved that it is 1 pm now.
1956 O. Pearson
123
as its object a tenseless fact that no tenseless emotion of relief could. It follows that
any tenseless fact a tensed emotion is responsive to is a fact a tenseless emotion
could be responsive to. Given the object of an emotion is the sole ground of its
appropriateness and a person’s tensed and tenseless reliefs could be sensitive to the
same tenseless facts—that is share objects—the reliefs’ appropriateness must
coincide. If no tenseless relief is justified, then neither is any tensed relief. It follows
that if one supposes that the object of Prior’s relief is a tenseless object, then one
cannot use that object to account for the appropriateness of his relief, contrary to the
externalist view reflected in our everyday approach to emotions.
In a connected manner, it is implausible that Prior would be motivated by a
tenseless fact or in other words that a tenseless fact could be the object of his relief.
This is because if the object of an instance of relief is a tenseless fact, then that relief
is not justified by that object. But it is implausible that one is motivated in a majority
of instances by things that do not justify those instances. Yet, the account being
considered would have to make this generalisation given that most of our emotions
are tensed and it is intended to be a general account. Here, as elsewhere, a principle
of charity must underlie interpersonal understanding.31 We cannot recognize the
beliefs of someone and also that most of these beliefs are irrational by our standards
and similarly we cannot recognize the emotions of someone and that most of their
emotions are inappropriate or unjustified by our standards. (Someone who says ‘‘I’m
relieved’’ when and only when a distant stranger says ‘‘apple’’ is someone who
appears not to be relieved at all.) Additionally, it appears that one needs little more
than to be made aware of the object of their relief to be motivated to feel relieved
and so it would be odd if Prior was aware of a tenseless fact which was the object of
his relief long before he was relieved.
In giving this argument I have supposed that relief, as a general category of
emotion, will have certain justificatory reasons. This assumption coincides with our
general treatment of relief as a category of emotion that concerns a response to
discomfort and is made appropriate in this responsiveness. Similar points apply to
other emotions: fear concerns danger, anger concerns wrong doing, grief concerns
loss, and so on. Furthermore, these distinctions are used by some to delineate forms
of emotions, for example, it is in part because an emotion concerns a danger that we
can identify that emotion as an instance of fear.32 Although tenseless and tensed
emotions of relief require different expression they are nevertheless both instances
of relief and as such are identical in their concern for discomfort. It is therefore not
an adequate response to my argument to distinguish tenseless and tensed instances
of relief as distinct forms of emotion, suggesting that one fact might be a
justificatory reason for tensed emotions of relief and not for tenseless emotions of
relief. In order to make this response to my argument work one would have to alter
the current taxonomy of emotions. Whilst such an alteration is possible it would
require independent justification without which this response to my argument is
unfounded.
31 Cf. Davidson (2001b: 137) (and perhaps Wittgenstein 2001: part I, Sects. 241 and 242).
32 Cf. Deonna and Teroni (2012: 41).
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Therefore, if we adopt a tenseless theory we cannot account for the appropri-
ateness of Prior’s relief in terms of the object of his relief—the reason for which he
became relieved. If the object is tensed but does not exist, Prior’s emotion is not
appropriate as its object does not exist. Alternatively, if the object is tenseless,
Prior’s emotion is not appropriate because tenseless facts do not make instances of
relief which have them as objects appropriate. But, it is natural to take the object of
Prior’s emotion to play the role of making his emotion appropriate. He is
appropriately relived if and only if the object of his relief obtains.33 If one is
relieved that the exams are over and the exams are over, then one’s relief is justified
and appropriate, as Prior’s is. Conversely, if they are not over, one should not be
relieved. The tenseless theory is thus inadequate as it has done nothing to address
this natural and plausible idea with which it is incompatible.
5 Inadequacies of the Mellor/MacBeath account
The Mellor/MacBeath theory does offer an alternative account for why it is that
Prior’s relief is appropriate. As already noted, it refers to the brute fact that relief about
an event that is after that event is justified. But, if this is said by the tenseless theorist
we do not have an account that is on a par with the account that a tensed theorist can
offer (contra Mellor 1981b: 50, a, 1998: 42). The tenseless and tensed accounts of the
justification of Prior’s relief both rely on brute facts (in the former case, that relief is
justified after the exams, in the latter that it is justified when the exams are past). But,
the tensed theorist offers us more besides this fact. S/he also offers us a story of the
manner in which this fact has import to the situation. The fact that the exams are past
makes the relief that they are past appropriate as this fact is the object of that relief—
the reason it was formed for. The Mellor/MacBeath theorist, however, offers no
explanation of this form. As a result, they also offer no explanation of why our
everyday talk fits the externalism about emotions outlined above or of why we say that
‘‘Prior is, quite righty, relived because the exams are over’’.
The Mellor/MacBeath tenseless theory cannot say, as surely we would, that ‘‘one
ought to be relieved because the exams are over’’. According to the Mellor/MacBeath
theory this utterance picks out nothing to justify relief. According to the utterance the
ground for the appropriateness of the relief is given by the clause ‘the exams are over’.
According to the Mellor/MacBeath account this clause picks out the fact that the
exams end before that utterance or before a particular time, t (where t happens to be
the time the utterance was made). However, on the Mellor/MacBeath theory these
facts are not what makes a feeling of relief justified. A feeling of relief is justified if
that relief is after the end of a discomfort. At best we have some sort of pragmatic
implication of a subjunctive conditional such as ‘if you were relieved simultaneously
with this statement then your relief would be justified’ or ‘if you were relieved at time
t then your relief would be justified’. But there appears to be nothing subjunctively
33 Actually, the matter is more complicated than this, as the object must also be something that justifies
the emotion, but in the present case this condition is met.
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conditional about the idea that one ought to be relieved which is expressed by a
statement like ‘‘one ought to be relieved because the exams are over’’. Nor does the
instruction appear to be merely pragmatically given. Of course, one might understand
an utterance like ‘one ought to be relieved because the exams are over’ less literally
and hence in a way more charitable to the Mellor/MacBeath account. However, the
point is that reasons must be given for giving this non-literal translation and until they
are the Mellor/MacBeath account is on the back-foot.
An alternative tenseless account of the appropriateness of emotions has been
offered according to which an emotion’s appropriateness stems from its causal
efficacy and the evolutionary advantage it offers.34 For example, an emotion of fear
can cause one to avoid a danger that follows it thereby prolonging the life of the
agent. However, an emotion of fear that concerns a danger that precedes that
emotion will have no such evolutionary advantage and so is inappropriate. Being
scared now won’t help me avoid the car speeding towards me yesterday.
Such an account faces a similar objection to the one just outlined in response to
the Mellor/MacBeath account. In particular, what would make an instance of relief
appropriate according to this account would be certain facts concerning causation
and evolutionary advantage bestowed on agents and these are not directly picked out
by the clause ‘the exams are over’ in an utterance of ‘‘one ought to be relieved
because the exams are over’’. The evolutionary account is, in this way, put at an
initial disadvantage when compared to the everyday account of emotions presented
in Sect. 3. This is not sufficient to show the evolutionary account to be false,
nevertheless the point to note is that this is one of many instances in which the
evolutionary account of emotions differs from the everyday account considered in
this paper. In order for the evolutionary account to be offered as a response to the
arguments of this paper one must therefore argue the case that the evolutionary
account of emotions is correct whilst the everyday account is false.
This paper is not the place for an extensive critique of different theories of
emotions, but I shall briefly raise a second reason for doubting the adequacy of the
evolutionary account. Specifically, the evolutionary account is based on causation and
a distinction between what follows or what precedes an emotion. However, the
appropriateness of an emotion, as noted above, in part follows a different distinction,
namely that between a tensed and a tenseless emotion. The tensed/tenseless
distinction is distinct from and cuts across the follows/precedes distinction. One can
have either a tensed or tensless emotion about something that follows it or about
something that precedes it. The follows/precedes distinction therefore cannot account
for differences in appropriateness that follow the former distinction. The evolutionary
account therefore must be mistaken in locating the source of the appropriateness of
emotions solely in the causal efficacy of those emotions. The current evolutionary
account is at best incomplete. On the other hand, grounding the appropriateness of an
emotion in its object as externalism does suffers no such difficulties because this
object may itself be tensed (and have certain causal potentialities).
34 Cf. for example, Maclaurin and Dyke (2002), Dyke and Maclaurin (2013), and, Suhler and Callender
(2012).
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6 Conclusion
The argument of this paper has the following form: our everyday practice suggests
that emotions are motivated by facts and are appropriate if these facts justify those
emotions; hence, if two emotions of relief differ in their appropriateness, then they
must be motivated by different facts; Prior’s thank goodness case shows that tensed
and tenseless emotions of relief differ in their appropriateness; therefore, tensed and
tenseless emotions of relief must concern different facts; the tensed theory of time is
thus vindicated. (Given the closeness between the cognitive component of an
emotion and a belief we might also say that tensed beliefs must concern different
facts to tenseless beliefs.)
It is important to notice that this argument is unaffected by the non-extensionality
of propositional attitudes. It does not base its conclusion on the fact that tensed and
tenseless emotions have different meanings or contents. It merely requires one to be
able to distinguish tensed and tenseless emotions, to recognize that they differ in
whether or not they are appropriate, and that whether or not an emotion is
appropriate is determined by its object.
This argument establishes a number of important points. First, it shows that there
can be an argument from emotions to a tensed theory of time if emotions are made
appropriate by their responsiveness to the world. Second, it shows that the common
Mellor/MacBeath response to Prior’s case is inadequate. This paper perhaps falls
short of establishing the tensed theory of time as that would require a more thorough
defence of this theory of emotions. However, that such a theory of emotions has
hope is supported by its fit with everyday practice and its resemblance to some
views of the emotions that have recently been defended.35 One should not simply
approach Prior’s argument and the emotions separately. On the contrary, a full
solution to the issues raised by Prior can only come about with a detailed account of
the emotions and until this is provided Prior’s argument may yet be found to have
implications for the metaphysics of time.
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